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OUR UNEASINESS WITH POLICE UNIONS: POWER AND VOICE 
FOR THE POWERFUL? 
MARCIA L. MCCORMICK* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When Michael Brown was shot by Officer Darren Wilson in August of 
2014 and people started to talk publicly to tell the story of what happened, to 
determine whether a crime had occurred, or to protest the shooting or living 
conditions of African Americans in Ferguson and cities like it, the two people 
in the best position to talk about what happened and why could not speak 
directly to the public. As a result, several prominent voices emerged. A number 
of witnesses, and the man who was with Michael Brown at the time he was 
shot spoke publicly about what they saw. A number of local activists and 
journalists tweeted and streamed video from the protests. Robert McCulloch, 
the St. Louis County Prosecutor was the voice of the state, and St. Louis 
County Police Chief Jon Belmar spoke frequently on behalf of law 
enforcement, primarily connected with the protests.1 
Absent were the voices of Michael Brown and Darren Wilson. It was 
obvious why Michael Brown could not speak, but maybe less obvious why 
Darren Wilson could not. Initially, the officer involved in the shooting was not 
identified. Later when he was identified, some were concerned that he or his 
family might be in danger, and that likely kept him from appearing publicly or 
speaking out. Even more likely there was simply no likely reason for Wilson to 
speak. As police officers know better than anyone, anything he said could 
become evidence in criminal proceedings, a civil action for damages, or simply 
in the court of public opinion. Moreover, anything he said could be used to 
determine his fitness to remain employed, to get a job anywhere else, and to 
keep any pension or other benefits he might be entitled to. Wilson had nothing 
 
* Marcia L. McCormick is an associate professor at the St. Louis University School of Law. Her 
scholarship has explored the areas of employment and labor law, federal courts, as well as gender 
and the law. Additionally, Prof. McCormick is a co-editor and contributor to the Workplace Prof 
Blog. Anne Blake is a third year law student at St. Louis University School of Law. Thank you to 
Meredith Rogers for inviting me to write on this subject and to Anne Blake for her excellent 
research assistance. 
 1. See, e.g., Matt Pearce, Protests again Roil Ferguson, Mo. over Michael Brown Shooting, 
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014, 11:14 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ferguson-police-
shooting-08132014-story.html. 
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to lose by keeping quiet except for the frustration that might come from not 
being able to publicly defend oneself from awful things others might say.2 
Wilson was not undefended, however. Often speaking in his defense, or at 
least speaking about the use of force generally from the police perspective, was 
Jeff Roorda, Executive Director of the St. Louis Police Officers Association.3 
Roorda was extremely vocal, taking many opportunities to publicly support 
Wilson and other officers, focusing on the difficult and dangerous job police 
have in the face of hostility and sometimes lawless behavior. Roorda was 
quoted or mentioned in hundreds of stories, national and international, about 
the shooting, police use of force generally, the police response to protesters, 
the situation in Ferguson, and civilian oversight of police.4 He appeared on a 
number of national news programs, like The Lead with Jake Tapper on CNN,5 
Anderson Cooper 360 on CNN,6 Erin Burnett Outfront on CNN,7 The Situation 
Room on CNN,8 CNN Tonight,9 and a variety of other shows on CNN,10 All 
 
 2. See generally Jake Halpern, The Cop, NEW YORKER (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.new 
yorker.com/magazine/2015/08/10/the-cop. 
 3. ST. LOUIS POLICE OFFICERS’ ASS’N, FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE – LODGE 68, 
http://www.slpoa.org/?zone=/unionactive/view_article.cfm&HomeID=152110&page=SLPOA 
(last updated Feb. 10, 2010). The St. Louis Police officer’s association is the division of the 
Fraternal Order of Police that represents officers in St. Louis. Id. The lodge that represented 
Wilson and other officers in the county was the Eastern Missouri Coalition of Police – Lodge 15. 
See also MISSOURI FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, http://www.mofop.org/lodges/. The Fraternal 
Order of Police is the union that represents police officers in Missouri. See also E. Mo. Coal. of 
Police, Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 15 v. City of Chesterfield, 386 S.W.3d 755, 758 (Mo. 
2012) (en banc). 
 4. Search of WestlawNext News Database, WESTLAW, next.westlaw.com (follow “News” 
hyperlink; then use the quoted search parameters: “adv: (jeff /2 roorda) % (technology one or 
“technology one”)” ) (returning more than 350 news stories after the shooting). 
 5. The Lead with Jake Tapper (CNN television broadcast Aug. 19, 2014; Nov. 21, 2014; 
Nov. 25, 2014; Dec. 1, 2014; Dec. 2, 2014; Mar. 12, 2015; Mar. 16, 2015; Apr. 17, 2015; Aug. 4, 
2015). 
 6. Anderson Cooper 360 (CNN television broadcast Nov. 25, 2014; Nov. 27, 2014; Aug. 
11, 2014; Sept. 2, 2015). 
 7. Erin Burnett OutFront (CNN television broadcast Nov. 15, 2014; Nov. 20, 2014; Nov. 
21, 2014; Nov. 25, 2014; Dec. 4, 2014; Mar. 5, 2015; Mar. 12, 2015; Mar. 16, 2015). 
 8. The Situation Room (CNN television broadcast Nov. 21, 2014; Nov. 24, 2014; Nov. 25, 
2014; Dec. 1, 2014; Jan. 29, 2015; May 7, 2015). 
 9. CNN Tonight (CNN television broadcast Mar. 4, 2015; Mar. 12, 2015; Mar. 13, 2015; 
Mar. 17, 2015; Mar. 20, 2015; Apr. 3, 2015; May 19, 2015; Aug. 4, 2015; Aug. 11, 2015). 
 10. See Newsroom (CNN television broadcast Nov. 14, 2014; Nov. 17, 2014; Nov. 25, 2014; 
Dec. 1, 2014; Mar. 4, 2015; Mar. 7, 2015, Mar. 13, 2015; Mar. 15, 2015; Mar. 16, 2015; May 5, 
2015; Aug. 4, 2015; Aug. 10, 2015); Special Live Event (CNN television broadcast Nov. 24, 
2014); New Day (CNN television broadcast Nov. 25, 2014; Dec. 3, 2014; Mar. 12, 2015; Mar. 13, 
2015; Aug. 4, 2015; Aug. 11, 2015); CNN @ThisHour (CNN television broadcast Dec. 1, 2014; 
Aug. 10, 2015); CNN Legal View (television broadcast Dec. 1, 2014, Aug. 4, 2015); Smerconish 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] OUR UNEASINESS WITH POLICE UNIONS 49 
Things Considered on NPR,11 The Today Show on NBC,12 Hannity on FOX,13 
the O’Reilly Factor on FOX,14 On the Record on FOX,15 and the Kelly File on 
FOX.16 He was also the subject of stories on national news programs, like All 
In with Chris Hayes on MSNBC17 and the Situation Room on CNN.18 Roorda 
became so outspoken and such a flashpoint for conflict, that the union 
eventually replaced him as a spokesman on issues related to civilian review of 
allegations of police misconduct in St. Louis.19 
While Roorda was especially visible and rather controversial, police union 
leaders all over the country often play a role in publicly defending officers 
accused of excessive force or other misconduct. That was true in the death of 
Freddy Gray in Baltimore,20 in the death of Eric Garner in New York,21 in the 
 
(CNN television broadcast Nov. 22, 2014); CNN Reliable Sources (CNN television broadcast 
Mar. 15, 2015). 
 11. All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast Aug. 28, 2014; Sept. 25, 2014); see also 
Weekend Edition (NPR radio broadcast Aug. 8, 2015). 
 12. The Today Show (NBC television broadcast Dec. 2, 2014). 
 13. Hannity (Fox News television broadcast Nov. 26, 2014), http://insider.foxnews.com/ 
2014/11/25/watch-hannity-takes-brown-family-attorney-daryl-parks. 
 14. The O’Reilly Factor (Fox News television broadcast Mar. 6, 2015). 
 15. On the Record (Fox News television broadcast Mar. 12, 2015; Mar. 13, 2015). 
 16. The Kelly File (Fox News television transcript Mar. 13, 2015). 
 17. All In with Chris Hayes (MSNBC News television broadcast Sept. 17, 2014; Dec. 2, 
2014; Dec. 3, 2014; Dec. 4, 2014). 
 18. The Situation Room (CNN television broadcast Jan. 29, 2015); New Day (CNN 
television broadcast Jan. 29, 2015); Early Start (CNN television broadcast Jan. 29, 2015); 
Newsroom (CNN television broadcast Jan. 29, 2015). 
 19. Christine Byers, Controversial St. Louis Police Union Leader Muzzled when it Comes to 
Civilian Review, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH (Feb. 16, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/ 
crime-and-courts/controversial-st-louis-police-union-leader-muzzled-when-it-comes/article_7fd 
6dbc2-e878-59a4-bd9a-cd056f9c1476.html; Newsroom (CNN television broadcast Mar. 15, 
2015). 
 20. E.g., John Bacon, Freddie Gray Settlement “Obscene,” Police Union Chief Says, USA 
TODAY (Sept. 9, 2015, 2:18 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/09/09/balti 
more-panel-approves-freddie-gray-settlement/71928226/; Colin Campbell & Justin George, 
Baltimore Police Union President Likens Protests to “Lynch Mob,” BALT. SUN (Apr. 22, 2015, 
10:33 PM), http://www.baltimore sun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-fop-news-con 
ference-20150422-story.html; Justin Fenton & Kevin Rector, Police Union Blasts Commanders 
in “After Action Review” of Riot, BALT. SUN (July 8, 2015, 9:26 PM), http://www.baltimoresun. 
com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-fop-report-20150708-story.html. 
 21. E.g., NYPD Chokehold Victim Eric Garner Complicit in Own Death, Union Says, 
CBSNEWS (Dec. 5, 2014, 7:21 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nypd-chokehold-victim-eric-
garner-complicit-in-own-death-union-says/; Joe Tacopino, Shawn Cohen & Yoav Gonen, Union 
Head Blasts City’s $ 5.9M Settlement in Eric Garner Case, N.Y. POST (July 13, 2015, 7:48 PM), 
http://nypost.com/2015/07/13/city-reaches-5-9m-settlement-in-garner-chokehold-case/. 
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death of Ezell Ford in Los Angeles,22 and in the death of Tamir Rice in 
Cleveland.23 It was also true, although to a lesser extent, in the death of Walter 
Scott in Charleston, South Carolina, in which the officer was filmed shooting 
an unarmed man who was running away and appeared to then place a Taser 
next to his body.24 There the union called the shooting “beyond 
comprehension” but defended police generally and warned the public “not [to] 
allow the professional race agitators to seize this moment to advance their 
often self-serving opinions of what is wrong in South Carolina.”25 
A majority of the press coverage of these high profile shootings has 
focused on the most visible issues connected with the use of force by police. 
All of the victims who died were Black, and many of the officers were not. 
Thus, much of the outrage and protests about the shootings have focused on 
concerns about race and implicit or explicit bias by police officers.26 The 
“Black Lives Matter” movement was born of the sense that the shooting of 
young Black men by police officers or civilian vigilantes was an epidemic.27 
The use of force in these cases and others caught on film in the last few years 
also highlighted training issues for police – in each of these situations, the 
officer involved seemed to engage in a pattern of escalation of force and 
seemed to interpret anything less than complete cooperation and servility as 
aggression and resistance that had to be overcome.28 The police reaction to the 
protests with tanks, tear gas, and rubber bullets made Ferguson look like a war 
zone, highlighting the effects of militarization of local police funded by the 
Department of Homeland Security in its zeal to fight terrorist threats, or 
 
 22. Kate Mather, LAPD Union Blasts Police Commissioners over Ezell Ford Decision, L.A. 
TIMES (June 16, 2015, 4:46 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-police-commis 
sion-ezell-ford-20150616-story.html. 
 23. Tamir Rice Case Still Divides Cleveland after Reports, CBS NEWS (Oct. 11, 2015, 4:47 
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/tamir-rice-case-still-divides-cleveland-after-reports/. 
 24. See Al Baker, Police Unions, Facing Public Anger, Rethink How to Address Shootings, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/us/police-unions-facing-pub 
lic-anger-rethink-how-to-address-shootings.html. 
 25. Tri-County Lodge #3 Fraternal Order of Police, Open Letter from Fraternal Order 
President John C. Blackman, FACEBOOK (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.facebook.com/SCFOP3/ 
photos/a.570283016319701.148533.120522961295711/1040255622655769/?type=3&theater. 
 26. See, e.g., Lauren McCauley, With Nationwide Protests Against Police Brutality, Activists 
Declare: “Black Spring” Has Begun, COMMONDREAMS (May 2, 2015), http://www.common 
dreams.org/news/2015/05/02/nationwide-protests-against-police-brutality-activists-declare-black-
spring-has. 
 27. See Alicia Garza, A HerStory of the #BlackLivesMatter Movement, 
BLACKLIVESMATTER (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.thefeministwire.com/2014/10/blacklivesmat 
ter-2/. 
 28. See Seth Stoughton, How Police Training Contributes to Avoidable Deaths, THE 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/12/police-gun-
shooting-training-ferguson/383681/. 
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donated as a result of the drawdown in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.29 
Finally, in the broader context, the structure of St. Louis’s strange proliferation 
of municipalities and the way those municipalities seemed to be using low 
level offenses and their police forces to harass Black and poor people was 
examined to explain the large scale hostility and suspicion towards police.30 
Despite the visibility of Roorda and other police union leaders, the role of 
police unions in these high profile use of force cases has been the subject of 
very little media attention. The New York Times, for example, reported on the 
changing receptivity of the public to instinctive union responses to defend the 
officers at issue at all costs.31 A column by Russ Douthat challenged the 
propriety of allowing police unions and called for reform.32 The Atlantic 
focused on how job security provisions in collective bargaining agreements 
protect cops accused of unlawful force.33 Additionally, an article in The Nation 
focused on the challenges posed by the division between police unions and 
other parts of the labor movement.34 Outside of those examples, the media 
covered comments by union leaders, but did not really focus on the effects of 
those comments and other union efforts or on the unions as actors 
themselves.35 
 
 29. See Julie Bosman & Matt Apuzzo, In Wake of Clashes, Calls to Demilitarize Police, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/15/us/ferguson-missouri-in-wake-
of-clashes-calls-to-demilitarize-police.html; David Love, The Dangerous Militarization of Our 
Police, CNN (May 14, 2015, 3:39 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/13/opinions/love-move-
bombing-anniversary/; see generally RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE 
MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES (2013). 
 30. E.g., Stephen Deere, Ferguson Commission Tackles Municipal Courts, ST. LOUIS POST 
DISPATCH (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/ferguson-
commission-tackles-municipal-courts/article_34b7fb34-1eec-5703-bf6d-5ee56c45c22a.html. 
 31. See Baker, supra note 24; Noam Scheiber, Police Struggle with Loss of Privileged 
Position, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/06/us/police-struggle-
with-loss-of-privileged-position.html. 
 32. Ross Douthat, Opinion., Our Police Union Problem, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/opinion/sunday/ross-douthat-our-police-union-prob 
lem.html. The New Republic countered that the law governing use of force by officers and their 
relationships with prosecutors drove the inability to remove abusive officers. Brian Beutler, 
Police Unions Aren’t the Problem, THE NEW REPUBLIC (May 7, 2015), http://www.newrepublic. 
com/article/121736/police-unions-arent-problem-local-prosecutors-are. 
 33. Conor Friedersdorf, How Police Unions and Arbitrators Keep Abusive Cop on the Street, 
THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/how-police-
unions-keep-abusive-cops-on-the-street/383258/. 
 34. Michelle Chen, Police Unions Don’t Serve the People. Can the Labor Movement Force 
Them To?, THE NATION (Jan. 9, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/police-unions-dont-
serve-people-can-labor-movement-force-them/. 
 35. See, e.g., Cory Shaffer, Cleveland Police Union Reacts to Discipline of Officers 
Involved in 2012 Case, Cleveland.com (Jan. 26, 2016, 2:27 PM) (last updated on Feb. 1, 2016, 
12:42 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2016/01/cleveland_police_union_to_react 
_to_discipline_of_officers_invovled_in_2012_chase_live_coverage.html; Nina Mandell, NYC 
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Academic focus has been similar to that of the media. While there has been 
significant study of the use of force by police officers, there has been virtually 
no study of police unions.36 Similarly, while there has been significant study of 
public sector unions37, there has been little focus on police unions in particular. 
In this article, I hope to focus on some of the biggest issues related to police 
unions in these kinds of cases. I will outline briefly some of the objections to 
police unions generally and more specific objections to police unions in the 
context of police reform. I will also highlight some opportunities for police 
unions and for the public to promote reforms and better policing. 
II.  POLICE UNIONS 
Public sector unions are a relatively recent development. The Wagner 
Act38 excluded public sector employees, and it was not until the 1960’s that 
Congress and the states began enacting statutes allowing for collective 
bargaining in the public sector.39 Despite the shorter history of legal protection, 
public sector unions appear to be thriving compared to unions in the private 
sector. In 2014, 35.7 percent of public sector workers were in a union, whereas 
only 6.6 percent of workers in the private sector were union members.40 
Moreover, nearly half of local government employees were represented by a 
union.41 
Police officers occupy a unique social position. They are literally the arm 
of the executive branch and privileged to use force to keep the peace.42 As a 
result of that power, police conduct must be controlled to ensure it remains 
 
Police Union Chief Calls Media Coverage of James Blake Incident ‘Unjust and Un-American,’ 
USA TODAY (Sept. 16, 2015, 11:39 PM), http://ftw.usatoday.com/2015/09/nyc-police-union-
chief-calls-media-coverage-of-james-blake-incident-unjust-and-un-american; Nicole Norfleet, 
Police Union Official Critical of ‘Disgusting Chant’ at Black Lives Matter March, STAR 
TRIBUNE (Aug. 31, 2015, 11:20 PM), http://www.startribune.com/police-union-official-critical-of 
-digusting-chant-at-black-lives-matter-march/323465911/. 
 36. Samuel Walker, The Neglect of Police Unions: Exploring One of the Most Important 
Areas of American Policing, 9 POLICE PRACTICE & RES. 95, 107 (2008). 
 37. See, e.g., Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1676 (1984); 
Joseph Slater, The Strangely Unsettled State of Public-Sector Labor in the Past Thirty Years, 30 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 511 (2013). 
 38. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (1935). 
 39. Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, supra note 37, at 1676–77; Slater, supra note 
37, at 516–19. 
 40. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NEWS RELEASE USDL-15-0072, 
UNION MEMBERS – 2014 (2015). 
 41. Id. at tbl.3 (stating that local government workers include police officers and showing 
that 45.5 percent of local government employees are represented by unions). 
 42. HOWARD S. COHEN & MICHAEL FELDBERG, POWER AND RESTRAINT: THE MORAL 
DIMENSION OF POLICE WORK 56 (1991). 
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within constitutional limitations.43 At the same time, however, because no one 
including government officials is above the law, the police must be at least 
somewhat independent of political influence.44 This tension between constraint 
and freedom can be difficult to manage, and workplace protections for police 
officers illustrate that tension.45 In some ways police officers need more 
protection than other kinds of public employees, and in other ways, they 
should have less protection. 
One reason that police might need more ability to negotiate about working 
conditions, pay, and job security is that being a police officer can be a 
dangerous job. Police officers are more likely to be killed at work than people 
in other professions.46 Even though the number of fatalities in 2014, 103, may 
not sound high,47 the rate of illness and nonfatal injury is higher than for other 
workers.48 Another reason that police officers might need more protection than 
other workers is to guard against public corruption. If an officer can be forced 
to act or refrain from acting because of concerns about retaliation by superiors, 
politicians, or politically connected economic interests, then law enforcement 
cannot work.49 Similarly, if an officer can be too easily disciplined, those 
disciplinary processes might be strategically invoked by people to frustrate 
enforcement as part of a defense or even organized crime strategy. 
Police can bargain collectively in the vast majority of states;50 the subjects 
they can bargain over vary however,51 and only two states allow police officers 
to strike.52 Even where collective bargaining is illegal, employee associations, 
likely either the Fraternal Order of Police or the National Association of Police 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Philip Stenning, The Idea of the Political ‘Independence’ of the Police: International 
Interpretations and Experiences, in POLICE AND GOVERNMENT RELATIONS: WHO IS CALLING 
THE SHOTS? 183, 188 (Margaret E. Beare & Tonita Murray eds., 2007). 
 45. See generally JOHN KLEINIG, THE ETHICS OF POLICING 67–70 (1996). 
 46. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK 
HANDBOOK, POLICE AND DETECTIVES: WORK ENVIRONMENT (2014), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/ 
protective-service/police-and-detectives.htm#tab-3 (last visited Mar. 29, 2016). 
 47. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NEWS RELEASE USDL-15-1789, 
NATIONAL CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES IN 2014 (PRELIMINARY RESULTS) 
(2015). 
 48. SHANNON M. MALONEY, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
NONFATAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES AMONG STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT WORKERS 9 
(2014) (reporting 11.3 cases per 100 police workers). 
 49. See Stenning, supra note 44, at 188–89. 
 50. MILLA SANES & JOHN SCHMITT, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RESEARCH, REGULATION OF 
PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE STATES 5 (2014) (reporting that bargaining by 
police is illegal in only five states – Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and 
Virginia – and only another four have no statute or case law on the legality of police unions – 
Alabama, Colorado, Mississippi, and Wyoming). 
 51. SANES & SCHMITT, supra note 50, at 7. 
 52. SANES & SCHMITT, supra note 50, at 9. 
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Organizations,53 attempt to represent interests of employees, for example 
providing legal or advocacy support or access to disability or other insurance 
policies.54 Police unions are also politically powerful, often, with political 
action committees that are sometimes the largest contributors to candidates for 
office.55 
Police can collectively bargain in Missouri, but police unions are in an odd 
position in the state. The Missouri Constitution provides a right to organize and 
bargain collectively for public sector workers, recognized in 2007,56 but the 
public sector labor law does not cover police officers.57 Thus, departments are 
required to bargain in Missouri, but the subjects of bargaining and processes 
for doing so are not clearly defined.58 
III.  PERILS 
Public policy surrounding public sector unions is somewhat conflicted.59 
Collective bargaining in the public sector is looked at less like an economic 
process and more as a political process.60 Government offices are not primarily 
viewed as economic actors, but instead as instruments of public policy and 
providers of essential services that cannot effectively be provided in the private 
sector, which must be accountable to the public through the political process.61 
Concerns over public employee strikes, undue influence over government 
policy by unions, and the economic effects of organized public employees 
made public employee unions controversial, historically.62 Unions protect 
 
 53. 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLICE SCI. 1314 (Jack R. Greene eds., 3d ed. 2007). 
 54. See SANES & SCHMITT, supra note 50, at 12–68 (including a table with state-by-state 
information on police union bargaining). 
 55. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLICE SCI., supra note 53, at 1314. 
 56. Independence-Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. Independence Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 131, 136–39 
(Mo. 2007) (en banc). 
 57. MO. REV. STAT. § 105.510 (2000). 
 58. See id. 
 59. See Slater, supra note 37, at 512–13 (describing instability in public sector labor law 
from 1980 to 2010: “Because there is so much variation in the public sector, there is no single 
story of the past thirty years to tell”). 
 60. Martin H. Malin, Does Public Employee Collective Bargaining Distort Democracy? A 
Perspective from the United States, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 277, 279–80 (2013) (citing 
HARRY H. WELLINGTON & RALPH K. WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 29-30 (1974); 
Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156, 
1164 (1974)). 
 61. See generally Beyond Distrust: How Americans View Their Government, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.people-press.org/2015/11/23/beyond-distrust-how-
americans-view-their-government/. 
 62. See Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, supra note 37, at 1676–77; Martin H. 
Malin, The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, IND. L.J. 1369, 1369–70 (2009) [hereinafter 
The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law]; Daniel M. Rosenthal, Public Sector Collective 
Bargaining, Majoritarianism, and Reform, 91 ORE. L. REV. 673, 681–93 (2013). 
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public worker salaries and benefits when the public might be able to pay less 
for those things,63 and requiring public employers to bargain over those matters 
and others gives public employees access to decision makers that no other 
interest group has.64 Even some supporters of public sector bargaining accept 
this view that public sector bargaining may subvert the public interest and be 
antidemocratic, but justify any danger of antidemocratic effect by the fact that 
without it, pressure from the public will always prevail to keep wages and 
benefits for public employees at exploitative levels.65 
In addition to critiques that public sector unions interfere with democracy, 
allowing collective bargaining in the public sector is also often portrayed as an 
obstacle to effective government.66 To the extent that public sector unions 
bargain for job security for members, seniority, wage scales, and staffing 
levels, they are viewed as interfering with the kind of management 
prerogatives that can reward the most innovative, creative, and productive 
employees and penalize the lazy or incompetent.67 In addition, the obligation 
of management to bargain over the effects of changes to work policies are 
viewed as limitations on the ability of government to adapt efficiently to 
changing conditions.68 
To some extent, police unions have symbolized the worst dangers of public 
sector unionization. At the beginning of the twentieth century, public 
employees were beginning to join unions and seek to collectively bargain. 
Union density was rising. But then the Boston Police strike of 1919 
singlehandedly ended the nascent growth of the public sector labor movement 
and became the singular doomsday scenario of what could happen if public 
sector workers were allowed to organize; its effects even influenced President 
Reagan’s handling of the illegal strike by the Professional Air Traffic 
Controllers Union in 1981.69 In one evening, 1100 officers walked away from 
their posts, and a night of rioting, violence, and looting followed by National 
 
 63. Daniel DiSalvo, The Trouble with Public Sector Unions, 5 NAT’L AFF. 3, 5, 7 (2010). 
The claim that public employees are “overpaid” compared to those in the private sector was a 
common claim used by pundits and politicians attempting to stir up resentment of public sector 
unions. See Slater, supra note 37, at 537–38. 
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 65. See Summers, supra note 60, at 1159–61. 
 66. See The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, supra note 62, at 1375–82, 1384. 
 67. The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, supra note 62, at 1380. 
 68. The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, supra note 62, at 1377 (referring to TSA travel 
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Guard efforts to restore order caused significant damage, many injuries, and 
five deaths.70 The idea of police officers striking is still a terrifying prospect. 
Police unions, more than other kinds of public sector unions,71 are often 
viewed as obstacles to reform, and there is a certain sense of adversary-ness 
between the officers on the street and high level officials and between the 
public and police.72 Police unions play a role in reinforcing the norms of the 
police subculture, which may include a sense of embattled warrior73 and a 
unity that prohibits testifying against officers accused of misconduct.74 This 
code of silence includes efforts to prevent investigations and to provide 
organized public group solidarity supporting officers accused of misconduct.75 
Police unions have quite strongly opposed efforts at citizen oversight.76 Unions 
also fight to keep all information related to discipline of officers secret.77 In 
fact, Jeff Roorda, who was a state representative in addition to his union role, 
introduced a bill in early 2014 to change the state's open meetings and records 
law to keep secret any information about internal investigations of police 
officers or any information about police shootings including the name of the 
officer involved unless the officer has been charged with a crime in connection 
with the internal investigation or shooting.78 
The fact that police unions seem especially powerful as a political group 
may make them also look more like obstacles to reform. To some extent, 
police unions have escaped the legislative crackdowns on other public sector 
unions. They were exempted from right to work laws in Michigan79 and from 
prohibitions on agency shops, fair share agreements, or voluntary dues check-
off in Wisconsin.80 Many other of the new laws focused primarily on 
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 74. Walker, supra note 36, at 102, 104. 
 75. Walker, supra note 36, at 102. 
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 77. Walker, supra note 36, at 106. 
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teachers.81 The fact that police unions have escaped this crackdown on public 
sector unions generally may make it look as if politicians have an interest in 
avoiding reforms that unions successfully resist. 
Police unions also have a somewhat checkered history on matters related to 
race and sex equality, both externally, in the relationship between the police 
and the public, and internally, with respect to employment of diverse officers. 
The modern police union movement is grounded in resistance to civil rights; it 
began or at least focused its efforts in response to the civil rights movement 
and criticism of the police in the 1960’s.82 Police unions are also situated on a 
race and class fault-line in the broader labor movement.83 One of the reasons 
that police unions were thought to be inappropriate was that allowing police to 
organize would divide their loyalty between their commanders and the union,84 
and loyalty to the union could make them side with labor when called to break 
up strikes.85 At the same time, police historically were used to enforce race-
based laws and to target Black people who asserted their rights.86 The 
indifference of the criminal justice system, including the police response, 
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towards women involved in sexual and intimate partner violence, and the high 
incidence of domestic violence by officers is also well documented.87 
Internally, the history is checkered as well. Just like for many other 
professions, police forces, where there were any Black officers, were 
segregated well into the twentieth century, and women of all colors were 
excluded.88 Moreover, while research has shown little significant difference in 
the way that officers of different racial groups or different sexes behave on the 
street, women seem to be significantly less likely to be involved in serious 
misconduct, repeated misconduct, or the subject of citizen complaints.89 
Finally, police unions seem, at times, to magnify racial tensions. White-
dominated police unions have brought many reverse discrimination suits, 
challenging affirmative action hiring plans, or simply challenging hiring that 
results in more minorities being hired.90 Furthermore, rhetoric surrounding 
communities of color, labelling young Black men as “thugs,” accusing 
peaceful protesters or Black Lives Matter activists as wanting police to be 
killed,91 only heighten the salience of race. African-American officers have 
their own professional associations even though technically they are also 
represented by the same union as white officers, and those professional 
organizations sometimes speak out against positions taken by white-dominated 
police unions.92 
In short, although police work can be dangerous and officers need to be 
protected from improper influence so that they can do their jobs, that 
protection comes with some costs. Those costs may seem especially high when 
persistent social gaps are evident in a community. The structure of the job and 
the legal limits on bargaining further exacerbate this. Police interactions are 
often by nature high conflict,93 and that conflict can lead to violence. Police 
policies are set at the top, not usually through collaboration with the rank and 
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file.94 For example, in the early twentieth century, police reform focused on 
professionalization imposed in an authoritarian, top-down manner, and little 
has changed.95 
Public sector bargaining law institutionalizes this preference by prohibiting 
bargaining over policies.96 By prohibiting bargaining over public policy, public 
sector bargaining law allows unions not to take responsibility for implementing 
those policies.97 It further limits unions to bargaining over things like wages 
and working conditions, creating an adversarial dynamic with management 
imposing policies that the unions do not agree with (because they were not 
allowed to help form them) and negotiating technical ways to protect public 
employees from those policies or at least negative effects of them, in a way 
that ultimately may undermine or frustrate the policies.98 In other words, “the 
law has channeled public employee unions away from investing in the risks of 
the public enterprise and toward insulating their members from those risks. 
Unions have done such an effective job in their channeled role that their 
collective bargaining agreements can impede effective government.”99 
Especially relevant for police unions, they have generally been left out of 
discussions about accountability and citizen oversight despite 
recommendations that they be included to result in better policies and 
support.100 
IV.  PROMISE 
Although police unions are frequently criticized, the effects of police 
unions on innovation in policing, accountability of officers, or police-
community relations have not been studied much.101 Discussions in the legal 
literature about the way that police culture contributes to misconduct or efforts 
to stymie reform mention unions mostly in passing, without considering them 
separate from law enforcement officials.102 To the extent that police unions 
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have power to shape the culture of a department, imagine how effective they 
could be if harnessed for reform.103 Yet harnessing police unions has not been 
seriously entertained by reformers very often. In fact, a study of structural 
reform litigation instituted by the U.S. Department of Justice fails to even 
mention unions as having any role in instituting reform.104 Reformers and 
researchers may generally be silent about police unions because unions 
themselves do not seem to be seeking a cooperative place at the table. In short, 
there is little evidence to suggest that police unions actually have been 
involved in efforts at reform, either as an effort of the union or reformers. 
There have been calls, though, to increase police union participation in federal 
police reform efforts,105 and in other efforts at democratic policing.106 And at 
least occasionally, unions have supported reform efforts.107 
The biggest example is the recent effort to reform policing in Cincinnati. In 
that city, on April 7, 2001, a white police officer shot an unarmed black 
man.108 Protests and riots lasted for several days.109 The Mayor of Cincinnati 
requested that the Department of Justice review the police department's uses of 
force, and after the investigation, entered into an agreement.110 The parties 
involved in reaching the agreement were not just the DOJ and the city, 
however; the police union was also involved in the negotiated settlement that 
 
 103. See generally POLICE REFORM FROM THE BOTTOM UP: OFFICERS AND THEIR UNIONS AS 
AGENTS OF CHANGE (Monique Marks & David Sklansky eds. 2012). 
 104. Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 
MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1376–77 (2015) (stating that courts have refused union requests to intervene 
in structural reform litigation and regularly allow negotiations exclusively between the 
departments and the DOJ). 
 105. Elliot Harvey Schatmeier, Reforming Police Use-of-Force Practices: A Case Study of 
the Cincinnati Police Department, 46 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 539, 581–82 (2013) 
(attributing success of Cincinnati reforms in part to inclusion of police union as stakeholder); 
Kami Chavis Simmons, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 520–25, 526–41, 545–46 (2008) 
(describing federal hostility to at least one union effort to be involved in the consent decree 
process and calling for greater union involvement as a way to protect legitimate interests and 
ensure union support of reforms). 
 106. Monique Marks & Jenny Fleming, The Right to Unionize, the Right to Bargain, and the 
Right to Democratic Policing, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 178, 178 (2006). 
 107. Steve Wilson & Kevin Buckler, The Debate over Police Reform: Examining Minority 
Support for Citizen Oversight and Resistance by Police Unions, 35 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 184, 188 
(2010) (quoting a letter from the Police Officer’s Association of Columbia, Missouri, in favor of 
citizen review). 
 108. All Things Considered: Race Relations in Cincinnati (NPR radio broadcast Nov. 1, 
2001), http://www.npr.org/programs/atc/features/2001/nov/cincinnati/011101.cincinnati.html. 
 109. Id.; Alana Semuels, How to Fix a Broken Police Department, THE ATLANTIC (May 28, 
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/05/cincinnati-police-reform/393797/. 
 110. Department of Justice Agreement, Background, CITY OF CINCINNATI, http://www.cincin 
nati-oh.gov/police/department-references/department-of-justice-agreement/ (last visited Mar. 29, 
2016). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] OUR UNEASINESS WITH POLICE UNIONS 61 
resulted.111 Police unions often object when a city negotiates with the DOJ at 
least partially because they believe that consent decrees will "complicate patrol 
work, increase paperwork, increase oversight, reduce officer discretion and 
autonomy, and increase punishment for practices that the union considers 
'good police work.'"112 According to one researcher, the involvement of the 
union in this agreement helped that agreement lead to dramatic improvement 
with less use of force, use of less serious forms of force, and a drop in citizen 
complaints.113 Reforms were not quick, the union was not always seen as truly 
supporting the reforms, and Cincinnati is not perfect.114 Still, there is 
significant commitment to collaboration that remains.115 
Calls for union participation often focus on the need for stakeholder 
support and commitment to the solutions, but that conceives of union 
involvement going in only one direction, still from the top-down.116 Unions 
bring more to the table, however. They can help craft and implement solutions 
that will be more effective to reform police culture and change officer 
behavior.117 Unions have a large role in shaping the culture of a department, 
and they can help connect officers with the communities they police in.118 The 
interests of officers as workers and the interests of community members often 
align, in fact.119 Consider the Mission Statement of the Fraternal Order of 
Police, which exists in order to: 
“[S]upport and defend the Constitution of the United States; to inculcate 
loyalty and allegiance to the United States of America; to promote and foster 
the enforcement of law and order; to improve the individual and collective 
proficiency of our members in the performance of their duties; to encourage 
fraternal, educational, charitable and social activities among law enforcement 
officers; to advocate and strive for uniform application of the civil service 
merit system for appointment and promotion; to support the improvement of 
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the standard of living and working conditions of the law enforcement 
profession through every legal and ethical means available; to create and 
maintain tradition of esprit de corps insuring fidelity to duty under all 
conditions and circumstances; to cultivate a spirit of fraternalism and mutual 
helpfulness among our members and the people we serve; to increase the 
efficiency of the law enforcement profession and thus more firmly to establish 
the confidence of the public in the service dedicated to the protection of life 
and property.”120 
Several of the items in this statement highlight how the union’s interests 
could complement reform efforts, especially those focused on improvement of 
officer performance, the encouragement of engagement with the community in 
more than one item, and improvement of the standard of living and working 
conditions for officers.121 Alignment is not inevitable, but performance can 
easily encompass things like problem-oriented policing,122 and encouraging 
educational activities and efficiency can also promote training. Cultivating a 
true spirit of mutual helpfulness and fraternalism with the community served 
could easily encompass real connections, breaking down us versus them 
barriers.123 Improvement of the standard of living and working conditions for 
officers will help to attract and retain well qualified people.124 
Working conditions for officers are inextricably connected to community 
interests.125 Union concerns about insufficient staffing levels or long work 
hours for officers protect communities (as well as officers) to ensure not only 
enough law enforcement to serve their needs, but also officers who are healthy 
and able to perform well.126 Even the supportive role of unions may play a 
valuable role in keeping police officers healthy and able to perform at high 
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levels.127 For example, union and individual officer involvement in training is 
an opportunity for departments to reduce the kinds of stressors that may lead to 
more conflict.128 Training, and in fact being a training officer, has been found 
to reduce the likelihood of an officer engaging with individuals coercively.129 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The protests that have followed high profile shootings have suggested that 
the relationship between many police departments and at least the Black 
community is broken. Non-white people have far less confidence that the 
police can protect them from violent crime130 and most people think that the 
police do not treat people of all races equally.131 There are fractures within 
communities and between particular communities and the police as an 
entity.132 The recognition of this problem prompted President Obama to sign 
an executive order establishing the Task Force on 21st Century Policing.133 
That task force was charged with identifying recommendations for how 
policing practices can promote safe communities while building public trust.134 
Interestingly, the recommendations of that report incorporated a number of 
ways increased involvement of unions would lead to reform, but mentioned 
unions only rarely.135 
For example, one of the recommendations was that “[l]aw enforcement 
agencies should promote legitimacy internally by applying the principles of 
procedural justice,” and union leadership ought to be involved in policy 
development.136 Another provided that “[l]aw enforcement should be 
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encouraged to explore more flexible staffing models” as a way to promote 
work-life balance and encourage retention.137 Unions were mentioned in 
connection with collaboration to develop policies for the uses of new 
technology.138 Finally, two entire “pillars” of the report were focused on areas 
unions could play a big role in: training and education and officer wellness and 
safety.139 
Like President Obama, Governor Jay Nixon established a commission to 
study the social and economic conditions underlying the unrest in the St. Louis 
region after the shooting of Michael Brown.140 The Ferguson Commission held 
hearings and issued a report in the fall of 2015 making a number of policy 
recommendations, but also providing a narrative to put those recommendations 
into context.141 These recommendations, like the Task Force’s report, create 
room for including the police union as a partner, but there is no mention at all 
of that union explicitly.142 The first recommendation section of the report 
focuses on police reform, emphasizing reform to the use of force policies, 
changed training for officers, and a change to department cultures.143 One area 
that both the President’s task force and the Ferguson Commission focused on 
that could be viewed as either public policy or a staffing/assignment matter 
was the use of officers to issue tickets as a way to raise revenue or for any 
other reason not directly related to improving public safety.144 
The recommendations on changing police culture, training, and practices 
were reiterated in a number of “calls to action,” specific policy changes 
advocated as next steps by the commission.145 Community oriented policing 
and ways of building common community were specifically recommended, but 
no mention was made of the police union.146 Additional calls to action focused 
on developing policies about the use of new technology, and although 
soliciting input from officers was recommended to help law enforcement 
agencies evaluate the effectiveness of technology, that was the only mention of 
 
 137. FINAL REPORT, supra note 125, at 18. 
 138. FINAL REPORT, supra note 125, at 35. 
 139. FINAL REPORT, supra note 125, at 51–70. The implementation recommendations also 
suggested collaborating with unions by charging the Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services to “[p]rovide support to . . . national rank and file [police] organizations to encourage 
them to implement task force recommendations.” 
 140. 40 MO. REG. 5 (Jan. 2, 2015). 
 141. See generally THE FERGUSON COMM’N, FORWARD THROUGH FERGUSON: A PATH 
TOWARD RACIAL EQUITY 10–12 (Positive Change, 2015), apps.stlpublicradio.org/ferguson-
commission-priorities/assets/report.pdf (hereinafter Ferguson Commission Report). 
 142. See generally Ferguson Commission Report, supra note 141. 
 143. Ferguson Commission Report, supra note 141, at 24–29. 
 144. Ferguson Commission Report, supra note 141, at 32–35; FINAL REPORT, supra note 126, 
at 26–27. 
 145. Ferguson Commission Report, supra note 141, at 63–65, 76–77, 80. 
 146. Ferguson Commission Report, supra note 141, at 96–97. 
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officer input, and the union was not mentioned at all.147 Specific calls to action 
recommended instituting peer review of critical incidents and ensuring mental 
health services and other supports for officer well-being, with no reference to 
the police union.148 
Particularly because of the fragmented nature of the municipal structure of 
the St. Louis region and the resulting fragmentation of police functions,149 
enlisting the help of the police union to be a partner in reforming police culture 
and a demand for training could make those recommendations more 
successful. It is possible, though, that the outspokenness of police union 
leaders, especially Jeff Roorda, in the wake of the protests and at some of the 
commission meetings made any explicit inclusion of the union untenable.150 
Although they may sound critical, these observations about these reports 
are really not meant as a criticism, but merely to highlight a missed 
opportunity or room for future opportunities by union leaders and reformers. If 
the police unions in St. Louis and St. Louis County could become partners in 
efforts to reform our region’s policing and to address the social and economic 
forces underneath some of the conflict, real and lasting change would be more 
likely. 
  
 
 147. Ferguson Commission Report, supra note 141, at 70. 
 148. Ferguson Commission Report, supra note 141, at 84. 
 149. Ferguson Commission Report, supra note 141, at 33–34. 
 150. Ferguson Commission Report, supra note 141, at 180 (listing the President of the 
Missouri Fraternal Order of Police as one of the Ferguson Commission members). His inclusion 
speaks to potential unpublicized collaboration with the police union that led to the Commission’s 
report. 
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